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Abstract
The present paper studies the growth, welfare and e±ciency consequences of
the recent introduction of tax-favored retirement accounts in Germany in a general
equilibrium overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic lifespan and labor in-
come uncertainty. We focus on the implicit di®erential taxation of speci¯c savings
motives, the mandatory annuitization of bene¯ts and the impact of special provi-
sions for low-income households. The simulations indicate that the reform improves
overall economic e±ciency by about 0.6 percent of aggregate resources, but welfare
decreases signi¯cantly for future generations. Finally, we show that special provi-
sions could be very e®ective in raising the participation of low-income households
despite their low budgetary cost.
JEL Classi¯cation: H55, J26
Keywords: individual retirement accounts, annuities, stochastic general equilibrium,
¤Previous versions of the paper were presented at conferences and workshops in Garmisch,
Graz, Maastricht, Mailand, Mannheim, Prague, Utrecht and Wuppertal. We thank Peter Broer,
Anette Reil-Held, Kerstin Schneider, Âstein Th¿gersen and other seminar participants for helpful
comments and Fabian Kindermann for providing excellent research assistance. Financial support
from the Forschungsnetzwerk Alterssicherung (FNA) of the Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund
is gratefully acknowledged.
z Department of Economics, University of Wuerzburg, Sanderring 2, D-97070 WÄ urzburg
Fax: ++49-931-888-7129, E-Mail: hans.fehr@uni-wuerzburg.de1 Introduction
As many other OECD countries before, Germany has introduced a program to promote the
development of private pensions savings in 2001. The so-called \Riester pensions"(named
after the former secretary of work Walter Riester) are intended to compensate for the
phased-in cuts in future public pensions. In principle, the program design is very similar
to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) in the US or the United Kingdom. Contributions
to these accounts up to a certain contribution limit are voluntary, withdrawal before
retirement is restricted, and the savings are tax deferred. Therefore, contributions are
tax deductible, the accrued return on investment is tax exempt, but the pension bene¯ts
arising from these savings are fully taxed. However, three speci¯c features distinguish
the German reform design from the implementation of IRAs in other countries. First,
preferential tax treatment of old-age savings is partly ¯nanced by an increased taxation
of other savings. Second, the program mandates annuitization of the accounts at the time
of retirement. Finally, the program provides a direct subsidy which depends on the actual
family status and is very generous especially for low-income households with children.
The present paper attempts to quantify the e±ciency and distributional consequences of
the German Riester accounts. The e±ciency e®ects of the program originate from the
di®erential taxation of saving motives and the implicit provision of a longevity insurance.
As Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) have shown, it is not e±cient to eliminate the taxation
of capital income in a model with labor income uncertainty. Implicitly, capital income
taxation acts as an insurance device in such a model which improves economic e±ciency.
However, uniform taxation of all savings might also not be e±cient. Since precautionary
savings appear to be less sensitive to changes in the after-tax rate of return than life cycle
savings (see Cagetti (2001) or Bernheim (2002, 1199)), an optimal tax structure would
tax life cycle savings at a lower rate than precautionary savings. The reduced taxation
of savings in retirement accounts could be interpreted as a means to separate the two
savings motives. Since accounts are illiquid before retirement, only life cycle savings are
allocated there, while precautionary savings are allocated in liquid savings accounts. The
mandatory purchase of private life annuities at retirement also has e±ciency implications.
It is proposed in order to shelter participants against the risk of outliving their assets.
When private annuity markets are absent, mandatory annuitization overcomes this market
failure and increases aggregate e±ciency, see Fehr and Habermann (2008).
The distributional e®ects of the program work in two directions. First, mandatory an-
nuitization redistributes implicitly from future to existing generations since it reduces
unintended bequest. Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) show that the bequest reduction de-
1creases long-run capital accumulation and growth in an endogenous growth model. Fehr
and Habermann (2008) demonstrate in an exogenous growth model that future gener-
ations will be hurt by annuitization, if the interest rate is su±ciently higher than the
growth rate. In the latter case the bequest reduction dominates the bene¯ts from the
insurance provision. Second, due to the special provisions for low- and medium-income
savers we are also interested in the distributional implications within a cohort. The ques-
tion is here whether the special provisions are e®ective in increasing the participation
of low- and medium-income households. The answer to this question also determines
the e®ectiveness of the policy to create new savings. As indicated by Benjamin (2003),
savings incentives have a signi¯cant stronger impact among low-income savers whereas
contributions by high-income households are more likely to represent funds shifted from
existing savings. In addition, given the progressive income tax system, the budgetary
cost of traditional IRA schemes are likely to rise with the income of participants although
the e®ectiveness may well be declining. Consequently, traditional tax deferral is often
considered as an expensive means of encouraging additional saving, see the discussion in
Bernheim (2002) and OECD (2004).
In order to quantify the e±ciency and distributional consequences of the German Riester
accounts, we apply a general equilibrium overlapping generations model in the Auerbach-
Kotliko® (1987) tradition which includes mortality and individual income risk as well
as borrowing constraints. Private annuity markets are closed by assumption, but the
public sector provides partial insurance via the progressive tax system and the unfunded
pension system.1 _ Imrohoro¸ glu et al. (1998) evaluate in this framework the long-run
consequences of IRAs on the US capital stock for various contribution limits and tax
savings instruments. They conclude that about 9 percent of IRA contributions during
the 80ies constituted additional savings which raised the US capital stock by about 6
percent. Fuster et al. (2008) extend their framework by introducing mandatory retirement
accounts into a model with two-sided altruism where individual life expectancy and income
are positively correlated. Their study either eliminates the existing system or substitutes
halve of the contributions by mandatory savings in private accounts which are either
annuitized or not. While the long-run capital stock increases in all reform scenarios, the
mandatory saving programs outperform the full privatization policy in terms of long-run
capital and consumption growth.
The present study complements Fehr et al. (2008) who also analyze alternative IRA
options for Germany. Compared to the US studies, wo do not only compare steady states,
1Krueger (2006) as well as Fehr and Th¿gersen (2008) survey recent studies in this tradition.
2but compute the complete transition to the new long-run equilibrium in order to quantify
the intergenerational welfare consequences. After compensating existing households with
lump-sum transfers, we are also able to isolate the overall e±ciency consequences of the
policy reform. In addition, we include a progressive tax and subsidy system in order to
capture the intragenerational implications of the reform. Finally, our model assumes a
speci¯c individual preference structure that allows to distinguish the e®ects of risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution.
Our simulations indicate three central results. First, the reform increases economic e±-
ciency by roughly 0.6 percent of aggregate resources. The e±ciency gain is mostly due to
the fact that the reform improves the insurance properties of the tax system and allows
to tax di®erent savings motives separately. Second, despite the signi¯cant gains in aggre-
gate e±ciency, future generations are most likely hurt by the reform due to the reduction
of accidental bequest. In our benchmark calibration, long-run welfare decreases by 0.68
percent of lifetime resources. The welfare losses are stable for a wide range of parame-
ter combinations. Third, the study indicates that the special provisions for low-income
households are successful in increasing the participation of this group, but they may have
a negative side e®ect on labor supply.
The next section describes the modeling of the German savings incentive scheme. Then
we sketch the structure of the simulation model. Section four explains the calibration and
simulation approach. Finally, section ¯ve presents the simulation results and section six
o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 Saving incentives for low-income individuals
In order to highlight the central e®ects of Riester accounts, the modeling of their cen-
tral elements is highly stylized. Our simulation model simpli¯es withdrawal restrictions
and the annuitization requirement and ignores all transitional provisions for the phase-
in period between 2002 and 2008.2 In order to highlight the very special provisions for
low-income individuals, Table 1 compares the bene¯ts from traditional IRAs and from
the German system. The left column shows the gross income level of a contributor. As
in Germany it is assumed that contributions (s) amount to 4 percent of gross income
up to the contribution limit (^ s) of 2100 e. The third column reports the marginal tax
rate in Germany in year 2005 for a one-earner-couple when the income splitting method
2A detailed discussion of the institutional arrangements, the transitional provisions, the changes after
2005 and the recent development of Riester accounts is provided in BÄ orsch-Supan et al. (2007).
3Table 1: Bene¯t payments with alternative saving incentives (in e)
Gross IRA Marginal Traditional Direct German
income contribution tax rate IRA scheme saving system
(in %) (2) £ (3) subsidy max[(4);(5)]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10.000 400 0 0 350 350
20.000 800 19 152 350 350
30.000 1200 25 300 350 350
40.000 1600 27 432 350 432
50.000 2100 30 630 350 630
75.000 2100 35 735 350 735
100.000 2100 41 861 350 861
is applied. Column (4) computes the typical bene¯t in a traditional IRA scheme where
contributions could be deducted from the tax base. Due to the rising marginal tax rate,
the subsidy rate increases with income so that high-income individuals have a stronger in-
centive to contribute. The German system also allows such a tax deduction, but provides
in addition a direct subsidy (ds) which depends on the family status. If the contribution
is at least 4 percent of income, the saving subsidy consists of a basic subsidy of 154 e per
adult and an additional child subsidy of 185 e. Consequently, a family with two children
could receive about 350 e per adult, as shown in column (5). As in the last column,
tax authorities in Germany automatically compute whether the direct subsidy or the tax
allowance is optimal for the considered tax payer. Consequently, the German subsidy
system o®ers strong incentives for low- and medium-income families with children.
Of course, the above calculations only serve illustrative purposes. In the simulation model










yj ¡ min[sj; ^ s]
¢
(2)
computes individual income tax payments. The function T05(¢) de¯nes the marginal tax
schedule in Germany in year 2005 (inclusive solidarity surcharge) and yj denotes taxable
income at age j. Direct subsidies dsj are zero for traditional IRAs, so that the advantage












4This function includes the fact that direct subsidies are proportionally reduced if the
contributions are below 4 percent of annual income wj. The hump-shaped, age-dependent
transfer scheme trj tries to capture the changing family status over the life cycle. At age
20-24 transfers start at 200 e, then they increase linearly until they peak at 350 e at
age 35-44 and decline again afterwards. However, direct subsidies are not allowed to
exceed individual contributions. Therefore, a minimum saving amount is speci¯ed which
depends on the family status. For simplicity, we assume in the following that 10 percent
of contributions have to be at least ¯nanced from own resources.
In order to eliminate the liquidity of retirement accounts during employment and avoid





sj if j < jR and sj · 0
daj if j < jR and sj > 0
¡1 if j ¸ jR and sj > 0
0 else.
(4)
is added to the budget constraint (8). Consequently, before retirement (i.e. at age j < jR)
withdrawals from IRAs are not possible, since all the money would be lost.3 On the other
hand, positive contributions could induce a public transfer daj before retirement and a
prohibitive penalty if they are made after retirement.
3 The model economy
3.1 Demographics and intracohort heterogeneity
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals which may
live up to a maximum possible lifespan of J periods. At each date, a new generation is
born where we have normalized its size N1 = 1, i.e. we assume zero population growth.
Since individuals face lifespan uncertainty with Ãj < 1 the time-invariant conditional
survival probability from age j ¡ 1 to age j, i.e. Nj = ÃjNj¡1 and ÃJ+1 = 0.
Our model is solved recursively. Consequently, an agent faces the state vector zj =
(j;aj;aR
j ;epj;ej) where j 2 J = f1;:::;Jg is the household's age, aj 2 A = [a
¹
;¹ a]
denotes (liquid) assets held at the beginning of age j, aR
j 2 R = [a
¹
R;¹ aR] denotes assets in
individual retirement accounts held at the beginning of age j, epj 2 P = [ep;ep] de¯nes
the agent's accumulated earning points for public pension claims and ej 2 Ej = [ej;ej] is
the individual productivity at age j.
3Of course, it would be no problem to consider lower penalties, see Fehr et al. (2008).
5Since income is uncertain the productivity state is assumed to follow a ¯rst-order Markov
process described in more detail below. Consequently, each age-j cohort is fragmented
into subgroups »(zj), according to the initial distribution (i.e. at j = 1), the Markov
process and optimal decisions. Let X(zj) be the corresponding cumulated measure to
»(zj). Hence, Z
A£R£P£Ej
dX(zj) = 1 for all j = 1;:::;J
must hold, as »(zj) is not a®ected by cohort sizes but only gives densities within cohorts.
In the following, we concentrate on the long-run equilibrium and omit the time index t and
the state index zj for every variable whenever possible. Agents are then only distinguished
according to their age j.
3.2 The household side
Our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable, nested
CES utility function. In order to isolate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, we
follow the approach of Epstein and Zin (1991) and formulate the maximization problem
of a representative consumer at age j and state zj recursively as

























In (5) the variables `j, cj and qj+1 denote leisure, consumption and bequest at age j,
respectively. The parameters ± and ° represent the discount rate and the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution between consumption in di®erent years while ¹ de¯nes the
strength of the bequest motive. Since lifespan is uncertain, the expected utility in future
periods is weighted with the survival probability Ãj+1. Productivity ej at each age j is un-
certain and depends on the productivity in the previous period. Consequently, ¼(ej+1jej)
in (6) denotes the probability to experience productivity ej+1 in the next period if the
current productivity is ej. The parameter ´ de¯nes the degree of (relative) risk aver-
sion. Note that for the special case ´ = 1
° we are back at the traditional expected utility











6where ½ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure at each age j. Finally, the leisure preference parameter ® is assumed to be age
independent.
The budget constraint is de¯ned as follows:
aj+1 = aj(1+r)+wj+pj+bj+vj¡¿ min[wj;2 ¹ w]¡sj¡[T(yj;sj)¡Áj(sj)]¡(1+¿c)cj (8)
with a1 = 0 and aj ¸ 0 8 j. In addition to interest income from savings raj, households
receive gross labor income wj = w(1¡`j)ej during their working period as well as public
pensions pj during retirement. As time endowment is normalized to one, 1 ¡ `j de¯nes
working time and w the wage rate for e®ective labor. They may receive (accidental)
bequests bj and in some simulations they receive (or have to ¯nance) compensation pay-
ments vj which are explained below. During employment, they contribute to the public
pensions system but only up to the contribution ceiling which amounts to the double
of average income ¹ w. They also contribute to or withdraw from retirement accounts sj
and have to pay progressive income taxes T(¢) where in some cases the direct subsidies
are subtracted. All remaining income is used for consumption where the consumer price
includes consumption taxes ¿c.










1 = 0 and aR
j ¸ 0 8 j. Without annuitization at age j, we set !j = 1, so that the
survival probability Ãj has no e®ect on the individual return, i.e. rj = r. If retirement
account assets are annuitized at age j, we set !j = 0, so that the periodic returns are
annuitized, i.e. rj > r. Note that contributions cannot exceed the contribution limit ^ s.
After retirement (i.e. j ¸ jR and sj · 0) we have to distinguish two cases: First, without
mandatory annuitization, retired households can decide how much to withdraw. Second,
with mandatory annuitization, retirees receive a ¯xed bene¯t depending on their wealth







i=jR+1(1 + ri)¡1: (10)
Our model abstracts from other annuity markets. Consequently, private assets and non-
annuitized retirement account assets of all agents who died are aggregated and then
distributed among all working age cohorts following an exogenous age- and productivity-







qi+1(zi)dX(zi) for all j = 1;:::;jR¡1; (11)
7where qi+1(zi) = (1 + r)[ai+1(zi) + !i+1aR
i+1(zi)(1 ¡ ¿b)]. The age distribution of bequests
is computed in the initial steady state where we assume that the heirs always receive the
assets of the generation which was 25 years older. Since bequest can be received only
during employment, we adjust this rule at the beginning and at the end of employment.
Within a generation bequests are distributed proportional to the current productivity
level ej, which highlights their stochastic nature and also re°ects empirical evidence.4
Finally, inheritances from IRAs are due to a speci¯c inheritance tax ¿b since they were
accumulated tax free.5
3.3 The production side
Firms in this economy use capital and labor to produce a single good according to the
Cobb-Douglas production technology Y = %K"L1¡" where Y;K and L are aggregate
output, capital and labor, " is capital's share in production, and % de¯nes a technology
parameter. Capital depreciates at a constant rate ±k and ¯rms have to pay corporate
taxes Tk = ¿k
£
Y ¡ wL ¡ ±kK
¤
where the corporate tax rate ¿k is applied to the output
net of labor costs and depreciation. Firms maximize pro¯ts renting capital and hiring
labor from the households so that the marginal product of capital net of depreciation and
corporate taxes equals the market interest rate r and the marginal product of labor equals
the wage rate w for e®ective labor.
3.4 The government sector
Our model distinguishes between the tax system and the pension system. In each period
the government issues new debt ¢B and collects taxes from households and ¯rms in order
to ¯nance general government expenditures G as well as interest payments on its debt.
Whereas government purchases of goods and services G are ¯xed per capita, we assume
a constant debt to output ratio of 60 percent in the benchmark case. Consequently, the
long-run equilibrium (i.e. where ¢B = 0) government budget is de¯ned by
G + rB = Ty + ¿cC + Tb + Tk; (12)
4De Nardi (2004) highlights the link between individual productivity and inheritance. Fehr et al.
(2008) also report the consequences of alternative bequest distributions.
5If account owners in Germany die before retirement, their heirs have to pay back all the tax bene¯ts
received in former periods if the wealth is not transferred to another retirement account.
8where C de¯nes aggregate consumption (see equation (20)) and revenues of income and















!j+1(1 ¡ Ãj+1)(1 + r)a
R
j+1(zj)dX(zj):
We assume that contributions to public pensions are exempted from tax while the bene¯ts
are fully taxed. Consequently, taxable gross income yj is computed from gross labor
income net of pension contributions and a ¯xed work related allowance dw, nominal6
capital income net of a saving allowance ds and - after retirement - public pensions
yj = max[wj ¡ ¿ min[wj;2 ¹ w] ¡ dw;0] + max[~ raj ¡ ds;0] + pj: (13)
Note that we do not include interest income from retirement accounts.
The pension system pays old-age bene¯ts and collects payroll contributions from wage
income below the contribution ceiling which is ¯xed at two times the average income ¹ w.
Individual pension bene¯ts pj of a retiree of age j ¸ jR in a speci¯c year are computed
from the product of his earning points epjR the retiree has accumulated at retirement and
the actual pension amount (APA) of the respective year:
pj = epjR £ APA: (14)
In each year of employment, the worker receives an earning point depending on his relative
income position wj= ¹ w up to the contribution ceiling. Since the latter is ¯xed at the double
of average income ¹ w, the maximum earning points that could be collected per year are 2.
Accumulated earning points at age j are therefore
epj+1 = epj + min[wj= ¹ w;2]; (15)
with ep1 = 0.
The budget of the pension system must be balanced in every period. Consequently, the









A£R£P£Ej min[wj(zj);2 ¹ w]dX(zj)
: (16)
6In order to re°ect realistic features of capital income taxation in a model without in°ation, we assume
for taxation purposes a nominal interest rate ~ r, i.e. real interest rate r plus a ¯ctive in°ation of two percent
per year. The latter exacerbates the distortions of real capital income taxation, see Feldstein (1997).
93.5 Equilibrium and the computational method
Given the ¯scal policy fG;B;T05(:);¿b;¿c;¿k;¿;Á;!; ^ sg, a stationary recursive equilib-
rium is a set of bequests fb(zj)gJ
j=1, value functions fV (zj)gJ
j=1, household decision rules
fcj(zj);`j(zj);sj(zj)gJ
j=1, time-invariant measures of households f»(zj)gJ
j=1 and relative
prices of labor and capital fw;rg such that the following conditions are satis¯ed:
1. given ¯scal policy, factor prices and bequests, households' decision rules solve the
households decision problem (5);
2. factor prices are competitive, i.e.







































j )dX(zj) ¡ B: (21)
4. Let 1h=x be an indicator function that returns 1 if h = x and 0 if h 6= x. Then, the




















6. the government budget (12) as well as the budget of the pension system (16) are
balanced intertemporally;
7. the goods market clears, i.e.
Y = C + ±kK + G:
10The computation method follows the Gauss-Seidel procedure of Auerbach and Kotliko®
(1987). For the initial steady state which re°ects the current German tax and social
security system without retirement accounts, we start with a guess for aggregate vari-
ables, bequests distribution and exogenous policy parameters. Then we compute the
factor prices, the individual decision rules and value functions. The latter involves the
discretization of the state space which is explained in the appendix. Next we obtain the
distribution of households and aggregate assets, labor supply and consumption as well as
the social security tax rate and the consumption tax (or surcharge) rate that balances gov-
ernment budgets. This information allows us to update the initial guesses. The procedure
is repeated until the initial guesses and the resulting values for capital, labor, bequests
and endogenous taxes have su±ciently converged.
Next we solve for the transition path after the introduction of retirement accounts. We
assume that the transition between the initial and the new ¯nal steady state takes 4 £ J
periods. Given the alternative policy parameters we assume in the ¯rst guess that aggre-
gate values and bequests of the initial equilibrium remain constant along the transition.
Then we update for each period of the transition the individual and aggregate variables
until we reach convergence.
4 Calibration of the initial equilibrium
In order to reduce computational time, each model period covers ¯ve years. Agents start
life at age 20 (j = 1), are forced to retire at age 60 (jR = 9) and face a maximum
possible life span of 100 years (J = 16). The conditional survival probabilities Ãj are
computed from the year 2000 Life Tables reported in Bomsdorf (2003). With respect to
the preference parameters we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ° to 0.5, the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ½ to 0.6, the coe±cient of relative risk aversion ´
to 4.0 and the leisure preference parameter ® to 1.5. This is within the range of commonly
used values (see Auerbach and Kotliko®, 1987) and yields a compensated wage elasticity
of labor supply of 0.3 in our benchmark. Finally, we abstract from bequest motives (i.e.
set ¹ = 0:0) and set the time preference rate ± to 0.9 in order to calibrate a realistic
capital to output ratio, which implies an annual discount rate of about 2 percent.
With respect to technology parameters we chose the general factor productivity % = 1:5
in order to normalize labor income and set the capital share in production " at 0.3. The
annual depreciation rate for capital is set at ±k = 0:06. The annual APA value is currently
about 310 e. We have adjusted this amount slightly in order to derive a realistic standard
11pension7 and contribution rate for Germany. As already explained, the taxation of gross
income (from labor, capital and pensions) is close to the current German income tax code
and the marginal tax rate schedule introduced in 2005. We assume that our households are
married couples with a sole wage earner and apply the German income splitting method.
In addition, we consider a special allowance for labor income of dw = 1200 e while for
capital income the special allowance amounts to ds = 3600 e (per couple)8. Given taxable
income yj the marginal tax rate rises linearly after the basic allowance of 7800 e from 15
percent to maximum of 42 percent when yj passes 52.000 e. In addition to the income tax
payment, households pay a surcharge of 5.5 percent of income taxes. The consumption
tax rate is set at ¿c = 0:17 and the corporate tax rate is ¯xed at ¿k = 0:15. Since the
benchmark equilibrium is without retirement accounts, we set ^ s = 0.
In order to model the income process, we distinguish six productivity pro¯les across the
life cycle. Fehr (1999) has estimated ¯ve such pro¯les from data of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP). We split up the pro¯le of the lowest income class in order
to improve the income distribution. When an agent enters the labor market (at age 20-24)
he belongs to the lowest productivity level with a probability of 10 percent, to the second
lowest again with 10 percent and to higher levels with 20 percent, respectively. After
the initial period, agents change their productivity levels according to the age-speci¯c
Markov transition matrices which are reported in the appendix. The latter are computed
also from SOEP data for di®erent years between 1988 and 2003. Speci¯cally we sorted
the primary earners of the years 1988, 1993 and 1998 into seven cohorts and divided them
within each cohort into six income classes. Then we compiled for each cohort and income
class the respective income classes of its members in the surveys of the years 1993, 1998
and 2003 in order to calculate the age-speci¯c transition matrices.
Table 2 reports the calibrated benchmark equilibrium and the respective ¯gures for Ger-
many in 2005. The reported bequest in Table 2 are purely accidental since annuity markets
are missing. The (endogenous) consumption tax rate is 17 percent which is quite realistic
for Germany.
The models income and wealth distribution is more equal than in reality. Partly this
re°ects the fact that the share of younger cohorts (i.e. those cohorts where income and
wealth are less dispersed) in the total population of the model is higher than in Germany.
Note that the two lowest productivity classes of the youngest cohort would like to borrow
7The standard pension in Germany is computed for a worker who has received an average wage during
employment - i.e. epjR = jR ¡ 1 - and amounts to roughly 60 percent of net average earnings.
8In Germany this allowance is currently 3000 e for nominal interest income, but 6000 e if the source
of capital income are dividends.
12Table 2: The initial equilibrium
Model Germany
solution 2005¤
Pension bene¯ts (% of GDP) 13.1 12.7
Pension contribution rate (in %) 19.5 19.5
Tax revenues (in % of GDP) 20.3 20.0
Average income tax rate (in %) 7.9 {
Interest rate p.a. (in %) 3.4 {
Bequest (in % of GDP) 4.3 5.2
Capital-output ratio 2.9 3.0
Gini index net income 0.296 0.299
Gini index wealth 0.540 0.613
Households with borrowing constraints (in %)
age 20-24 20.0 10.0
age 25-29 7.3 18.9
age 30-34 5.5 18.9
age 35-39 4.1 17.1
age 40-44 2.5 17.1
*Source: IdW(2007), DIW (2005), SAVE survey.
because they expect a higher productivity (and therefore income) in the future. For older
cohorts, the fraction of liquidity constraint agents decreases sharply. After age 35 we
hardly observe liquidity constrained households. Recent evidence from the SAVE survey
indicates that our model exaggerates borrowing constraints at young ages but understates
the constraints in middle-ages.
5 Simulation results
This section presents the quantitative results when we simulate the German Riester reform
in four successive steps. In the ¯rst simulation we increase the taxation of capital income.
Then we introduce traditional IRAs without mandatory annuitization. Next, the IRAs
are annuitized after retirement and in the ¯nal step we add the special provisions for
low-income households. The following subsection explains some technical details of the
computation. Then we discuss the macroeconomic and welfare e®ects of the considered
policy reforms.
135.1 Experimental design and welfare computation
Our four reform simulations can be distinguished by alternative combinations of ds;¿b; ^ s;!j
and trj. In the benchmark equilibrium of Table 2 these parameters are set at ds = 1:800
e, ¿b = ^ s = trj = 0 and !j = 1. In the ¯rst simulation we simply eliminate the saving
allowance (i.e. we set ds = 0).9 Next we combine the increase of ordinary capital income
taxation with the introduction of traditional IRAs, i.e. ds = 0 and ^ s = 2:100 e. Due
to the deferred taxation we assume that inheritances from these accounts are taxed at
¿b = 0:165, which equals the average marginal income tax rate in the benchmark. In the
third simulation we add the annuitization of the accounts at the time of retirement, i.e.
!j = 1 if j < jR and !j = 0 if j ¸ jR. Finally, we introduce trj > 0 in oder to arrive at
the German system.
Of course, all policy reforms a®ect the tax revenues of the government. In order to balance




t=1 [G ¡ Ty;t ¡ Tb;t ¡ Tk;t](1 + r)1¡t
P1
t=1 Ct(1 + r)1¡t :
The periodical budget is then balanced by the endogenous debt level, i.e.
Bt+1 = Bt(1 + r) + G ¡ Ty;t ¡ ¿cCt ¡ Tb;t ¡ Tk;t:
Next we turn to the computation of the welfare changes. The welfare criterion which is
applied to assess a reform is ex-ante expected utility of an agent, before the productivity










We assume that the reform is implemented after agents know that they have survived
but before the productivity shock is revealed. Consequently, the individual welfare e®ect
is derived from the expected utilities in the initial equilibrium and after the reform an-
nouncement. Following Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987, 87) we compute the proportional
increase in consumption and leisure (W) which would make an agent in the baseline sce-
nario as well o® as in the reform scenario. If the expected utility level of an individual age
j in year t after the reform is E[V (zj;t)] and the expected utility level on the baseline path
is E[V (zj;0)], the necessary increase (decrease) in percent of initial resources is computed
9Note, however, the saving allowance was not completely eliminated but only severely reduced in









for individuals born before and after the reform. Consequently, a value of Wj;t = 1:0
indicates that this agent would need one percent more resources in the baseline scenario
to attain expected utility E[V (zj;t)].
In order to asses the aggregate e±ciency consequences, we introduce a Lump-Sum Redis-
tribution Authority (LSRA) in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987, 65f.) as well
as Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) and Fehr et al. (2008). The LSRA pays a lump-sum
transfer (or levies a lump-sum tax) to each living household in the ¯rst period of the
transition to bring their expected utility level back to the level of the initial equilibrium.
Consequently, age-j agents who were alive in the initial equilibrium are compensated by
the transfers vj;1(Wj;1 = 0), that depend on their status in the initial equilibrium and
guaranty the initial expected utility level E[V (zj;0)]. On the other hand, those who enter
the labor market in period t of the transition receive a transfer v1;t(W1;t = W ¤) which
guaranties them an expected utility level E[V (z1;t)] = V ¤. Note that the transfers v1;t
may di®er among future cohorts but the expected utility level V ¤ is identical for all. The












1¡t = 0: (25)
With V ¤ > E[V (z1;0)] (i.e. W ¤ > 0), all households in period one who have lived in the
previous period would be as well o® as before the reform and all current and future new-
born households would be strictly better o®. Hence, the new policy is Pareto improving
after lump-sum redistributions. With V ¤ < E[V (z1;0)] (i.e. W ¤ < 0), the policy reform is
Pareto inferior after lump-sum redistributions.
5.2 Macroeconomic e®ects of savings incentives
This section discusses the macroeconomic e®ects of the simulated reforms. The ¯rst col-
umn (\Capital income taxation") in Table 3 reports the changes in central macro variables
when we extend the taxation of capital income by eliminating the capital allowance.10
The elimination of capital income allowances allows to reduce the consumption tax rate
by 1.7 percentage points. Aggregate savings decrease by roughly 4.4 percent in the long-
run. Since public debt remains almost constant in the long-run, the capital stock even
10The reform starts in the second period, since we don't want to alter the taxation of existing assets.
15Table 3: Macroeconomic e®ects of savings taxation and retirement accounts
Capital Introduction of retirement accounts
income taxation Traditional Annuitized German
(ds = 0) IRA IRA system
Savingsa
2010-14 0.2 1.2 1.0 0.9
2015-19 -1.3 0.9 0.5 0.2
2025-29 -3.1 2.1 0.8 0.5
1 -4.4 7.7 3.9 3.9
IRA share in savings (in %)
2010-14 0.0 5.5 6.3 6.4
2015-19 0.0 11.8 12.9 13.2
2025-29 0.0 26.0 26.1 26.6
1 0.0 44.5 46.2 46.9
Capital stocka
2010-14 -1.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
2015-19 -2.9 -0.6 -1.1 -1.3
2025-29 -4.5 -0.3 -1.6 -1.9
1 -5.7 2.2 -1.8 -1.9
Labor supplya
2005-09 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.5
2015-19 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -1.0
2025-29 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -1.0
1 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0
Wagesa
2005-09 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1
2015-19 -0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
2025-29 -1.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3
1 -1.7 0.7 -0.6 -0.6
Public debt (in % of GDP)
2010-14 64.8 64.7 64.8 65.0
2015-19 64.1 65.0 65.1 65.1
2025-29 63.0 68.5 68.0 68.1
1 62.2 80.0 79.1 79.6
Bequesta
2005-09 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1
2015-19 -1.2 -0.9 -2.9 -3.0
2025-29 -2.5 -0.1 -12.3 -12.5
1 -4.1 12.9 -45.2 -45.6
Consumption tax rate (in percentage points)
2005- -1.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.2
aChanges are reported in percentage over initial equilibrium.
16decreases by 5.7 percent, so that the interest rate increases by about 0.3 percentage points.
The lower capital stock reduces wages and labor supply. Finally, due to lower savings also
accidental bequest decrease by about 4 percent in the long-run.
In the following two simulations, we keep the full taxation of ordinary asset returns but
introduce retirement accounts without (\Traditional IRA") and with (\Annuitized IRA")
mandatory annuitization of bene¯ts after retirement. Younger and future generations
now increase savings in tax-favored accounts so that aggregate savings rise throughout
the transition. Since tax revenues decline and are shifted from current to future periods,
the consumption tax rate is higher than in the ¯rst simulation and public debt increases
during the transition. Due to higher public debt, the capital stock and wages only increase
slightly in the long-run without annuitization. Note that we would get quite similar e®ects
for savings and the capital stock as _ Imrohoro¸ glu et al. (1998) if we would not alter capital
income taxation. From the ¯gures in Table 3 we can also compute that in the long-run
about 16 percent of IRA contributions represent new savings. 11 This corresponds quite
well with Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) who found that in the United Kingdom about 9
percent of IRA contributions are from new savings.
However, matters are quite di®erent when we introduce annuitized accounts in the next
simulation. Assets of deceased are now transferred to surviving elderly. Consequently,
while bequests still increase in the second simulation, they decrease now dramatically so
that long-run savings and the capital stock are much lower than before. In the last column
(\German system") we keep annuitization but introduce the direct savings subsidies. Of
course, such a program increases cost, therefore the consumption tax has to rise while
savings and the capital stock change as before. In the German system, those people who
contribute less than 4 percent of their income can increase the transfer rate for given
savings if they work less, see the de¯nition (3). Consequently, this feature of the saving
subsidy design induces a negative labor supply e®ect which is evident in Table 3.
Whereas Table 3 documents that the share of savings in retirement accounts rises dur-
ing the transition, Table 4 reports how cohorts contribute to the accounts in the new
long-run equilibrium. People ¯rst have to build up precautionary savings against income
uncertainty. Consequently, 60 percent of the youngest cohort do not contribute to the
accounts at all. With rising age participation rates and contributions increase since ex-
isting precautionary savings reduce the exposure to income uncertainty.12 Note that with
annuitized accounts contributions rise especially before retirement. Since after retirement
11This ¯gure is derived from 1
0:445(1 ¡ 1
1:077) = 0:161.
12This corresponds to the ¯ndings of Hrung (2002) who shows that in the U.S. IRA savings are lower
for individuals exposed to high income risk.
17income uncertainty is eliminated, precautionary savings are reshu²ed to retirement ac-
counts in order to increase longevity insurance. BÄ orsch-Supan et al. (2007, 18) con¯rm
for Germany that participation increases with age initially but then it declines again after
age 50. Currently Riester pensions are most common in the 30 to 49 age group. One
reason for the low participation rate among elderly might be that our model does not
re°ect the transitional period between 2002 and 2008 where subsidy payments were much
lower and the regulation of Riester pensions was more complicated. In addition, we also
do not consider the future reduction of public pension bene¯ts. The latter induces a clear
incentive especially for middle-age and young individuals to save more for retirement.
Table 4: Average participation in retirement accounts (in %)
Traditional IRA Annuitized IRA German system
0 < sj < ^ s 0 < sj < ^ s 0 < sj < ^ s
Age sj = 0 sj = ^ s sj = 0 sj = ^ s sj = 0 sj = ^ s
20-24 60 20 20 60 20 20 60 20 20
25-29 49 12 39 44 17 39 0 61 39
30-34 40 06 55 34 09 57 0 48 52
35-39 24 19 58 20 16 64 0 44 56
40-44 18 16 66 15 15 70 0 38 62
45-49 17 14 69 15 11 74 1 29 70
50-54 17 11 71 16 9 76 3 22 75
55-59 19 17 64 14 6 81 3 17 80
Apart from the initial cohorts, the German system in the right part of Table 4 induces an
extremely high participation rate. Of course, this mainly re°ects changes in the behavior
of low-income households. Table 5 compares the participation rate of the bottom decile in
the traditional retirement account with annuitization and in the German system. Whereas
with traditional accounts still 56 percent of the bottom decile don't contribute at all in
the period before retirement, this fraction decreases to 13 percent in the German system.
Consequently, the direct subsidy payments are quite e®ective in increasing participation
and contributions among low-income households. This is also con¯rmed by BÄ orsch-Supan
et al. (2007, 19) who document that Riester accounts are particularly popular among
larger families with children.
5.3 Welfare e®ects of saving incentives
Next we turn to welfare consequences for di®erent cohorts in the reform year and the
long-run without and with compensation payments from the LSRA. As already explained
18Table 5: Participation of low-income households (in %)
Annuitized IRA German system
0 < sj < ^ s 0 < sj < ^ s
Age sj = 0 sj = ^ s sj = 0 sj = ^ s
20-24 100 0 0 100 0 0
25-29 100 0 0 0 100 0
30-34 99 1 0 0 100 0
35-39 90 8 2 0 100 0
40-44 74 23 3 0 98 2
45-49 72 18 10 1 92 7
50-54 65 18 17 5 79 16
55-59 56 20 24 13 64 23
above, we ¯rst compute the welfare changes of agents before their productivity is revealed
and then derive an average welfare change for the di®erent productivity types in each
cohort that already lives in the initial equilibrium. Therefore, Table 6 distinguishes in
each cohort between \poor",\median", and \rich" households. \Poor" agents are the 10
percent of the cohort with the lowest realized productivity level, \median" are those 20
percent who realize a medium productivity level and \rich" are those 20 percent of the
cohort with the highest productivity.13 For newborn cohorts along the transition path
we are not able to disaggregate ex-ante welfare e®ects. Consequently, we report in the
middle column the ex-ante welfare change of the whole cohort and in brackets the (ex-
post) welfare changes for \poor" and \rich" newborn households after their productivity
is revealed to them. Table 6 compares the extension of capital income taxation and the
introduction of (non-annuitized) traditional retirement accounts in the present model.
Not surprisingly, an increase in capital income taxation balanced by reduced consumption
taxes is especially bene¯cial for medium and old-aged households with low wealth holdings.
All households gain from the reduction of consumption taxation, but poor elderly are
also hardly a®ected by the increase in capital income taxation. While medium-aged
households have build-up assets already, they are hurt by the increase of capital income
taxation. Since the reform reduces wages in the long-run signi¯cantly, generations born
in the future lose. The di®erences within the cohorts are rather insigni¯cant. Next we
simulate the reform with lump-sum compensation payments of the LSRA in order to
isolate the aggregate e±ciency consequences of the rise in capital income taxation.14 The
13For pensioners we aggregate the respective fractions in earning points.
14We do not report the macroeconomic e®ects of simulations with compensation payments, but they
19compensated welfare changes for all generations alive in the initial equilibrium are then
zero and newborn generations experience identical relative consumption increases. As
shown in the forth column, rising capital income taxes increase aggregate e±ciency by
0.35 percent of remaining resources. This is due to the fact that the reformed tax system
(with more income and less consumption taxation) o®ers more income insurance.15
Table 6: Welfare e®ects of alternative capital income tax regimes
Age in Capital income taxation Traditional IRA
reform Consumers compen- Consumers compen-
year poor median rich sated poor median rich sated
90-94 1.11 0.98 0.90 0.00 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.00
80-84 1.03 0.93 0.83 0.00 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.00
60-64 0.95 0.41 0.13 0.00 0.01 -0.36 -0.57 0.00
40-44 0.53 0.22 0.12 0.00 0.20 0.07 -0.08 0.00
20-24 (0.35) 0.20 (0.00) 0.35 (0.12) 0.07 (0.05) 0.06
0-4 (-0.20) -0.22 (-0.27) 0.35 (0.17) 0.11 (0.01) 0.06
1 (-0.35) -0.33 (-0.36) 0.35 (0.56) 0.42 (0.24) 0.06
aChange are reported in percentage of initial resources.
The introduction of (non-annuitized) traditional retirement accounts in the right part
of Table 6 neutralizes (at least partly) the increase in capital income taxation. Since
consumption taxes fall much less, the welfare gains of already retired generations are now
much lower than in the ¯rst simulation. Medium-income and rich households who retire
in the reform year even experience signi¯cant welfare losses. They can't bene¯t from the
new accounts, consequently they fully bear the increase of capital income taxes but now
they bene¯t from reduced consumption taxes much less. Welfare of newborn and future
generations now increases after the reform since these cohorts can reduce their capital
income tax burden signi¯cantly by saving in the accounts and long-run wages increase now
slightly. Since higher wages relax existing liquidity constraints, long-run poor households
are signi¯cantly better o® than the respective rich ones. Since now the consumption tax
rate remains almost constant, the reform only changes the taxation of di®erent saving
motives. Although highly elastic old-age savings are exempt from taxation, the aggregate
e±ciency gains are fairly small.
The left part of Table 7 shows that annuitization mainly reduces the welfare of newborn
are available on request.
15This corresponds with the results of Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) who ¯nd in a similar set-up an
aggregate e±ciency loss after a switch from income to consumption taxation.
20and future generations. Already retired cohorts are only a®ected by the slightly higher
consumption tax rate. Since former intergenerational transfers are substituted by transfers
within a generation, working generations in the reform year are signi¯cantly better o® than
before. They still receive bequest from the elderly and bene¯t from increased longevity
insurance. On the other hand, future generations are much worse o® than before since they
are hurt by the signi¯cant reduction of unintended bequest. In the long-run the welfare
reduction amounts to 0.85 percent of remaining resources. Note that future generations
lose although aggregate e±ciency rises signi¯cantly by roughly 0.5 percent of aggregate
resources. The latter re°ects the value of the longevity insurance which is provided by
the annuity.
Table 7: Welfare e®ects of annuitized retirement accounts
Age in Annuitized IRA German system
reform Consumers compen- Consumers compen-
year poor median rich sated poor median rich sated
90-94 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.00 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 0.00
80-84 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.00 -0.16 -0.13 -0.14 0.00
60-64 -0.10 -0.46 -0.66 0.00 -0.35 -0.68 -0.86 0.00
40-44 1.34 1.11 0.53 0.00 1.81 1.13 0.39 0.00
20-24 (0.40) 0.41 (0.55) 0.48 (0.58) 0.57 (0.60) 0.58
0-4 (-0.35) -0.32 (-0.16) 0.48 (-0.19) -0.17 (-0.13) 0.58
1 (-0.90) -0.85 (-0.74) 0.48 (-0.71) -0.68 (-0.70) 0.58
aChange are reported in percentage of initial resources.
Finally, in the right part of Table 7 the German system of (optional) direct subsidies
reduces welfare of retired households due to the increase in consumption taxes. As one
would expect, low-income newborn and future households are better o® compared to the
previous simulation, but they still experience welfare losses from the reform. Of course,
they bene¯t directly from the subsidies but they are also hurt by the higher consumption
taxes. On the other hand, future rich households are almost not a®ected. Direct subsidies
for low-income households improve the insurance properties of the tax system while they
also distort labor supply. Since the insurance e®ect dominates the distortionary e®ect,
the last column reports only a slight increase in aggregate economic e±ciency compared
to the previous simulation.
215.4 Sensitivity analysis
The positive e±ciency e®ects and the negative long-run welfare e®ects of the German
system turn out to be quite robust. Table 8 reports the long-run macroeconomic and
welfare e®ects as well as e±ciency consequences for alternative parameter combinations
and economic assumptions. For better comparison the ¯rst line repeats (in bold numbers)
the results for the benchmark case from Tables 3 and 7. With risk neutral agents (i.e.
when ´ = 0:0) precautionary savings decrease so that the time preference rate has to
increase in order to recalibrate the initial equilibrium with the same capital-output ratio
as in Table 2. Risk neutral individuals react stronger to the tax incentives. Consequently,
aggregate savings increase stronger and the long-run IRA share is higher than in the
benchmark. Therefore, unintended bequest fall much stronger so that long-run welfare is
even lower than in the benchmark. Since risk neutral individuals don't value the insurance
provision of the annuitized accounts, the e±ciency gain is reduced from 0.6 to 0.1 percent
of aggregate resources. Note that this is very close to the aggregate e±ciency gain in the
traditional IRA system of Table 6. In both cases aggregate e±ciency changes are mainly
due to the separate taxation of di®erent savings motives.
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis for the German system
Changes in long-run
´ ° ½ ¹ ± savings IRA share wages welfare e±ciency
4.0 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.91 3.9 46.9 -0.6 -0.68 0.58
0.0 0.97 4.7 51.5 -0.5 -0.81 0.12
0.33 0.95 0.0 45.5 -1.4 -1.31 0.35
1.5 0.95 7.0 45.1 0.5 -0.18 0.27
0.7 0.84 7.9 30.3 0.5 0.24 0.25
Small open economy 3.1 46.7 0.0 -0.48 0.43
Next we reduce the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from 0.5 to 0.33. Since the
consumption pro¯le becomes °atter, initial savings fall and the time preference rate has
to increase again to stabilize the capital-output ratio. Now savings incentives work much
less than in the benchmark. Savings in retirement accounts mainly represent funds which
are shifted from already existing accounts. As a consequence, aggregate savings remain
constant in the long-run. Since public debt increases as before, the capital stock decreases
much stronger and wages fall by 1.4 percent. The latter hurts future generations so that
long-run welfare decreases more than in the benchmark. Aggregate e±ciency increases
slightly less than in the benchmark since intertemporal distortions are reduced less when
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low.
22In the following simulation we assume an extremely high (compensated) labor supply
elasticity of about 1 by setting ½ = 1:5. In this case households work and save less in the
initial equilibrium so that again the time preference rate has to increase. The reaction
of labor supply is now much stronger than in the benchmark simulation. Employment
even falls in the long-run by 0.7 percent. At the same time aggregate savings rise much
stronger so that long-run wages now even increase by about 0.5 percent. Higher wages and
higher bequest reduce the long-run welfare losses compared to the benchmark. Since the
reform increases distortions of labor supply, aggregate e±ciency decreases with a higher
intratemporal elasticity of substitution.
Up to now people had no bequest motive. When we introduce such a \joy of bequest
giving" motive, savings rise so that the time preference rate has to decrease signi¯cantly in
order to recalibrate the initial equilibrium. A bequest motive has two major consequences.
First, annuitized accounts are less attractive. Second, additional resources of the surviving
elderly (from annuitized accounts) are now not consumed but saved for the descendants.
As a consequence, aggregate savings increase quite strongly while at the same time the
IRA share remains much low. Therefore, the capital stock increases much stronger so that
wages rise and future generations even experience a welfare gain. Of course, since now
people take less advantage of the insurance properties of accounts, aggregate e±ciency
decreases compared to the benchmark.
Finally, in the small open economy we can keep all parameters from the benchmark but
keep factor prices constant. People save now slightly less compared to the benchmark and
long-run generations lose slightly less due to constant wages. The aggregate e±ciency gain
is smaller compared to the benchmark probably because of the dampened savings reaction.
6 Discussion
This study intends to evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of the intro-
duction of tax-favored \Riester pensions" in Germany. Since savings in the accounts are
tax deferred, we assume that the government balances the intertemporal budget by the
consumption tax so that public debt increases during the transition. We ¯nd a long-run
decrease in the capital stock and wages of about 2 and 0.6 percent, respectively, although
aggregate savings increase during the transition. The reform increases economic e±ciency
by roughly 0.6 percent of aggregate resources but reduces the welfare of future generations
almost in the same relative amount. The e±ciency gain is mostly due to the fact that
the reform improves the insurance properties of the tax system and allows to tax di®erent
savings motives separately. Long-run welfare decreases because accidental bequest fall
23dramatically when retirement accounts include provisions for mandatory annuitization.
Finally, the study indicates that the special provisions for low-income households are suc-
cessful in increasing the participation of this group. However, the particular design of the
German system has a negative side e®ect on labor supply.
Therefore, the present study highlights the importance of including transitional dynamics
in tax and pension reform analysis. Since the long-run welfare changes are mainly due
to intergenerational redistribution, they don't even indicate the direction of the overall
e±ciency e®ects. Our results con¯rm the back-of-the-envelop calculations in Fehr and
Habermann (2008) who quantify e±ciency e±ciency e®ects of the introduction of annuities
in a stylized model.
Of course, the simulated reforms could be extended in various directions. It is no problem
to fully annuitize retirement account savings even before retirement, allow (as in Germany)
to withdraw a lump-sum amount at time of retirement, or model a choice between an
immediate annuitization at the beginning of retirement and a ¯xed pay-out plan combined
with delayed annuitization. However, these extensions have only very minor e®ects on
aggregate e±ciency. Fehr, et al. (2008) also consider alternative ¯nancing scenarios,
contribution ceilings and direct subsidy payments. While each reform design alters the
intergenerational welfare consequences, the aggregate e±ciency e®ect is hardly changed.
Of course, it would be no problem to include additional elements of the German Riester
reform such as the reduction of the unfunded public pension system. This extension would
increase the incentives to contribute to the accounts but it would complicate the welfare
analysis of Riester accounts. For this reason this extension is left to future research.
24Appendix A: Computational method
In order to compute a solution we have to discretize the state space. The state of
a household is determined by zj = (j;aj;aR
j ;epj;ej) 2 J £ A £ R £ P £ Ej where




j g are discrete sets. In this paper we use J = 16;nA = nR = 12;nP = 5
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1) = 0:2.
For all these possible states zj we compute the optimal decision of households from (5).
The pension grid is equidistant while the asset grid has increasing intervals between two
grid points. This is useful since the value function is heavily curved for low values of
assets. Since u(cj;`j) is not di®erentiable in every (cj;`j) and V (zj+1) is only known in a
discrete set of points zj+1 2 fj+1g£A£R£P £Ej, this maximization problem can not
be solved analytically. Therefore we have to use the following numerical maximization
and interpolation algorithms to compute households optimal decision:
1. Compute (5) in age J for all possible zJ. Notice that V (zJ+1) = 0 and households are
not allowed to work anymore. Hence, in the optimum households should consume
everything they have.
2. For j = J ¡ 1;:::;1:
Find (5) for all possible zj by using Powell's algorithm (Press et. al., 2001, 406®.).
Since this algorithm requires a continuous function, we have to interpolate V (zj+1).
Having computed the data V (zj+1) for all zj+1 2 fj+1g£A£R£P £Ej in the last







j+1) = EV (zj+1) (26)
for all k = 1;:::;nA, l = 1;:::;nR and m = 1;:::;nP. In this paper we use
multidimensional cubic spline interpolation, i.e. spj : S3 £ S3 £ S3 ! R, whereas
S3 is the space of all one-dimensional, twice continuously di®erentiable, piecewise
third-order polynomial functions and S3 £ S3 £ S3 is its tensor product (cf. Judd
(1998, 225®.)). For further information see Habermann and Kindermann (2007).
25Appendix B: Markov transition matrices
Age dependent Markov transition matrices
Age 20-24 Age 25-29
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.31 0.17 0.22 0.08 0.10 0.11
2 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.13 0.10 0.11
Current 3 0.07 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.33 0.25 0.14 0.09
productivity 4 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.33 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.31 0.22 0.09
level 5 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.24
6 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.46
Age 30-34 Age 35-39
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.37 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.05
2 0.18 0.25 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.12 0.03 0.02
Current 3 0.09 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.38 0.20 0.09 0.05
productivity 4 0.07 0.06 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.40 0.22 0.07
level 5 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.24 0.38 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.44 0.22
6 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.23 0.58 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.63
Age 40-44 Age 45-49
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.49 0.24 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.45 0.26 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.01
2 0.17 0.31 0.36 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.32 0.33 0.14 0.03 0.03
Current 3 0.07 0.13 0.40 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.44 0.27 0.07 0.02
productivity 4 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.40 0.29 0.06
level 5 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.47 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.46 0.20
6 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.66 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.70
Age 50-54
Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.42 0.22 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.04
2 0.14 0.30 0.35 0.11 0.06 0.04
Current 3 0.11 0.12 0.37 0.25 0.11 0.03
productivity 4 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.41 0.24 0.07
level 5 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.45 0.19
6 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.66
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1984-2001 SOEP data
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